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ARGUMENT
A.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE DOES
NOT ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO LIEN ABUTTING LOTS FOR WORK
PERFORMED ON PUBLIC ROADS.
1.

The Plain Language of Utah Code Section 38-1-1 Precludes Appellee's
Lien Claim.

Appellee, much like the district court, fails to take into consideration the plain
language of section 38-1-1. Instead, Appellee begs the Court to look beyond the plain
language of the statute to find provisions that simply aren't there. This is an incorrect
method of statutory interpretation. In Garrardv. Gateway Financial Services, Inc., 2009 UT
22,207 P.3d 1227, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the plain language of the Utah Unfair
Practices Act. Reviewing the phrasing and specific language contained in the statute, the
Court found that the Legislature's intent was unambiguous. Id. at ^f 11. The Court quoted
the familiar rule that "'[wjhere the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court
will not look beyond the same to divine legislative intent. Rather, we are guided by the rule
that a statute should generally be construed according to its plain language.'" Id., quoting
Brinkerhoffv. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989). Because of this rule, the Court went
on to refuse to "look to the language of the other Acts under the same title, such as the
Consumer Sales Practices Act, or administrative rules adopted pursuant to these additional
Acts to interpret the plain language of the Unfair Practices Act." Id. Thus, as the Court
reiterated, when the plain language of a statute evinces its meaning, the Court looks no
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further. See also Trench Shoring Services, Inc. v. Saratoga Springs Development, L.L.C.,
2002 Ut App 300, f 10 (statute must be interpreted according to its literal wording unless it
is "unreasonably confused or inoperable.").
Appellee concedes that "the plain reading of the statute, without adding to it, is that
the mechanic's lien statutes do not apply to the public improvement, itself" Appellee's
Brief, p. 25. Appellee posits that the language only prohibits a mechanic from attempting
to enforce a lien against the real property upon which the public improvement lies. Id. Thus,
Appellee urges, its lien can be enforced against other properties that benefit from the public
improvement that it worked on. Id. In fact, as Appellee itself points out, the plain language
of section 38-1-1 does not mention when a public improvement adds benefits to private
property, nor does it mention what happens when the construction of a public improvement
involves private entities or private projects. But contrary to Appellee's argument, the absence
of those situations from the language of the statute does not mean that a mechanics lien can
be filed and enforced in those types of situations. Instead, the plain language states that the
Mechanics Lien Statute does not apply at all See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1.
Under the plain terms of section 38-1-1, no provision of the Mechanic's Lien Statute
applies to a "public improvement." The statute says, "The provisions of this chapter shall not
apply to any public building, structure or improvement." The work at issue was the paving
of public, dedicated roads. Dedication of the roads vested fee title of those roads to Iron
County. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27a-607(l). The fact that the county owns them makes
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any itilprovemeiit on the dedicated roads a "public improvement." See Black's Law Diet.,
Deluxe Eighth Ed., p. 773 (defining a "public improv r

ut" as "an •: = movement made to

property owned by the state or any other political entity, such as a municipality"); see also
Western Lion Ltd. v. City ofMattoonf 462 N.E.2d 891,894 (111. App. 1984) ("the term 'public
improvement' is generally understood to mean any permanent improvement upon real
property owned by the municipality") (citations omitted); Ward v. Salt Lake City, 151 P. 905,
907 (Utah 1915) (including in its description of "public improvements" the "paving and
guttering of streets and in constructing sidewalks and cross-walks"); Utah Code Ann. §1727a-306(3)(g)(ii)(c) (streets are a "public improvement"); White v. Salt Lake City, 239 P.2d
210, 213-14 (Utah 1952) ("[W]hatever the nature of the title of the [pi ibli( • entitj ] in sti eets
and alleys...it is such as to enable the public authorities to devote them to public purposes");
Bennettv. Bow Valley Dev. Corp., 797P.2d419,422 (Utah 1990); Utah Code Ann. § 63H-1102(17); Happoldt v. Kutscher, 567 S.E.2d 380, n.6 (Ga. App. 2002) ("a road is a public
improvement"). By the clear terms of section 38-1-1, a lien is simply not a/v ailable foi
Appellee's improvements of these public roads - whether Appellee seeks to enforce its
purported lien against the roads themselves or against land abutting the roads is irrelevant,
because the statute si ales (hal the provisions ol'fiic Meduiiiit/'s I ini Statute "shall not apply."
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-1.
By asking this Court to determine that work on a public improvement can be enforced
against otlier properties that benefit from the public improvement simply because the work
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was performed pursuant to a private contract, Appellee requests that this Court look beyond
the statute to include within its definition something that simply is not there. That is what
the district court did. Despite acknowledging that "the work here was technically performed
on public property," Mem Dec. and Opinion, p. 9, the district court determined that section
38-1-1 did not prevent Appellee's lien because "no lien has been filed on any public
property", id., and the work was performed pursuant to a private contract rather than a public
contract. See id., pp. 8-9.
This expansive interpretation of section 38-1-1 violates the requirement that a court
construe a statute according to its plain language. See DOIT, Inc. v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926
P.2d 835, 843-44 (Utah 1996); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah
1989)); Trench Shoring Services, Inc. v. Saratoga Springs Development, L.L.C, 2002 UT
App 300, f 10, 57 P.3d 241. In order to affirm the district court and satisfy Appellee's
interpretative demand, this Court would have to rewrite section 38-1-1. This would be
improper. See Neel v. State, 889 P.2d 922, 926 (Utah 1995) (court has no power to rewrite
a statute); Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline Construction, 754 P.2d 672, 676 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988). Section 38-1-1 says nothing about an exception for liens against abutting
property in the event that the underlying contract for the public improvement is with a private
entity. Indeed, it says nothing about public contracts at all. All it says is, "[t]he provisions
of this chapter shall not apply to any public building, structure or improvement." Accordingly, the district court erred in its interpretation of section 38-1-1 when it held that, despite
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the terms of the statute, work performed on public property was lienable (against adjacent
lots that allegedly benefitted from the public improvement) because the work was performed
pursuant to a private contract. See Mem. Dec, p. 8.
Arguing on appeal that a "public improvement" must actively involve a "governmental entity having authority over the public property," Appellee's Brief, p. 19, Appellee
offers no legal authoi

'is statement

The same is true foi Appellee's unsupported

assertion that a "public improvement" must include "[p]ublic funds." Id. Though Appellee
looks to a treatise, McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, for assistance in the
definition of a "public improvement," these assertions are also not included therein. Indeed,
McQuil

- learly acknowledges that paving of streets is, in fact, a "puhlu improvement."

See 13 Eugene McQuillan, The Law ofMunicipal Corporations, §§ 37.2, p. 17-18; 37.16, p.
80 (3d ed. 1997). In any event, these assertions are contrary to the generally accepted
definition of "public improvement", as well as the Utah judicial and legislative definitions
set forth above.
Appellee also cites to McQuillin for the proposition that
in the case of a public improvement, since it would be
intolerable that public property should be encumbered with liens
in favor of contractors and others, it is provided that the lien
shall attach to the moneys in the hands of the municipality set
apart or appropriated for the payment of the sums to become due
upon contract for the improvement....
Id., p. 20 (quoting 13 Eugene McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 37.195 (3d
ed. 1QQ7A This quotation has no bearing on whether paving of a public road is a "public
8

improvement"; as set forth above, work performed on a public road meets the legal definition
of a "public improvement," and conforms with Utah case law and statutory authority.
Moreover, this quotation only proves Appellant's point - there is no availability of a lien in
the current situation. Appellee could have easily required that a bond be posted to protect
itself; it is lamentable that it did not and also that (as Appellee notes) Iron County did not
post one. But the absence of a bond in this case does not in some way alter or negate the
clear terms of the Mechanic's Lien Statute.
Because the work at issue was a "public improvement," there is no room for further
interpretation.1 Accordingly, the district court erred when it determined that, despite the
language of section 38-1-1, Appellee could enforce its lien against property that benefitted
from the public improvement. Appellant urges this Court to reverse the district court and
rule that, under the clear terms of section 38-1-1, Appellee's lien is simply not available.
2.

Section 38-1-3 Does Not Allow Appellee to Lien Abutting Lots For Paving
Work Performed on Public Roads.

Section 38-1-3 states that a person "shall have a lien upon the property upon or
concerning which they have rendered service..." Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3.

Appellee

acknowledges that the first part of this sentence does not apply because Appellee did not

Appellee raises an additional, one-paragraph argument at pp. 26-27 of Appellee's Brief
regarding purported work performed outside the dedication plat. The district court determined
that this was immaterial, particularly because the plat would have been amended (and the roads
thus still dedicated to the public) after the improvements were made. See Memorandum
Decision and Order, p. 18, n.l 1. As this was not the subject of a cross-appeal, Appellee's
argument in this regard should not be considered on appeal.
9

perfoini work "upon the property" it seeks to enforce its lien, instead, Appellee continues
to argue that it is entitled to rely on the "concerning which'1 portion of the statute. The district
court made this same determination. However, this analysis has twice been rejected by this
Court. Accordingly, reversal is appropriate.
Decades ago, this Court determined that this portion of the statute deals with two
classes of workers: work done by "contractors or laborers" such ,is Appellee, whose work
must be "done upon the property," and services provided by "architects and engineers" and
the like, whose work "may be regarded as done 'with respect to' or 'concerning' the
property." Zions First Nat Bank v. Carlson, 464

w 387, 388-89 (Utah 1970) (quoting

Stanton Trans. Co. v. Davis, 341 P.2d207,210 (uian 1959)) (emphasis added). Hie p]irase
"concerning the property" was thus held to relate only to particular artisans whose work by
its very nature is not performed "upon" the property.
Though the legislature altered the language of other portions of this statute over the
years, it left intact the provision that a person "shall have a liei i i lp :>n tl le pi opei t) i ipoi i or
concerning which they have rendered service...". Had the legislature disagreed with this
Court's interpretations in Carlson and Stanton, it could easily have altered such language.
It did not do so. I lad the legislatu1 •* *x •- ^-'d to eviscerate the requirement that work such as
paving be performed "upon" the property to be liened, it could have done so

Indeed, fhe

legislature could simply have changed the language to read that all work that simply
"benefits" property in any way is lienable against that property. Again, the legislature did
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not do so, and instead kept the precise language relied upon by this Court in Carlson and
Stanton. By failing to change this critical portion of the statute, the legislature has implicitly
endorsed this Court's prior rulings on the subject. See Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, f
25,158 P.3d 53; Theurer v. Board of Review, Indus. Com'n of Utah, Dept. of Employment
Sec, 725 P.2d 1338, 1342 (Utah 1986).
Appellee struggles to show that the district court did not err when it ruled that Carlson
and Stanton were distinguishable or that Appellee's work could somehow fit within the
"concerning which" language reserved for artisans such as engineers and architects. Though
Appellee mentions on more than one occasion that the designations provided in these cases
were only "examples," see Appellee's Brief, p. 30, it is unable to explain why its paving
work could possibly fit with that category, and provides no legal authority for that
proposition. To the contrary, it is clear that paving work performed on a road fits squarely
within work done by "contractors or laborers." Because that work was not "done upon the
property," Appellee is not entitled to lien abutting property for such work.
Accordingly, the district court's determination that Appellee's work falls within the
confines of section 38-1-3 is unfounded and should be reversed.
B.

FIRST OF DENVER MORT. INVESTORS V. ZUNDEL & ASSOC'S CANNOT
SAVE APPELLEE'S LIEN CLAIM AND IT SHOULD NOT BE EXPANDED
TO DO SO.
1.

The District Court Misapplied this Court's Ruling in First of Denver.

11

This Court's ruling in First of Denver Mortgage In vestors v. Zundel & Associates, 600
P.2d 521 (Utah 1979) cannot save Appellee's claim. That decision made two separate determinations: (1) that a water system installed in a subdivision was lienable because it was
necessary to make the subdivision residences habitable; and (2) that work could relate back
to prior work on the property for purposes of priority. Id. at 525-26. The first holding is not
dispositive of the issue presented here. And the second holding regarding priority of the lien
in that case is wholly irrelevant - the question here is whether Appellee's work, which was
not necessary to make any residences within the subdivision habitable, is lienable at all.
In regard to the particular issue of whether certain work was lienable under section
38-1-3, this Court held as follows:
It is not necessary to the attachment of a mechanics' lien that the
material or labor be furnished solely on a building structure or
that the work be performed solely on the lot on which a building
is being erected. We agree with the New Jersey Supreme Court,
which stated in J. R. Christ Construction Co. v. Willete Assocs.,
47 N.J. 473, 221 A.2d 538 (1966), that a contractor should not
be barred from enjoying the benefits of the mechanics' lien
statute where his work not only enhances the value of the
developer's land, but is also necessary to make residences to be
built on such property habitable.
First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundel & Associates, 600 P.2d at 525 (emphasis
added). Thus, to find that the work was lienable, this Court required both a showing of
enhancement and that the improvement was necessary to make the property habitable. To
date, this showing has not been made in the instant matter.
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In its application of First of Denver, the district court relied entirely on the
enhancement aspect of that case. The district court recognized that the paving work at issue
was "not, like water and sewer systems, which are 'necessary to make residences to be built
on [the] property habitable.'" Mem. Dec, p. 18 (quoting First of Denver, 600 P.2d at 525).
Nevertheless, the district court held that the ruling or rationale of First of Denver should
apply and render Appellee's work lienable because it determined that paving was "'essential
to the comfortable and convenient use of [the property].'" Id., p. 20 (quoting First of Denver,
600 P.2d at 525). This is insufficient under First of Denver. Effectively, the district court
further expanded Utah's lien laws by redefining what work and property may be liened.
Appellee is unable to provide any legal justification for this expansive interpretation, but
argues that its work "certainly provided some measure of benefit to each of the residential
lots to which access was made easier, more comfortable, and more convenient." Appellee's
Brief, p. 46. This is simply not enough under section 38-1-3 nor under First of Denver?
As set forth above, had the legislature intended that any work that simply enhances
or benefits real property is lienable, it could have altered the statute to reflect that intent. In
First of Denver, this Court held that work that "enhances" property and is "necessary" to
make that property "habitable" is sufficient to come under the statute. To further alter that

2

Appellee spends much of its argument relating to First of Denver discussing
priority and forseeability, see Appellee's Brief, pp. 36-38. These issues have no bearing
on whether work is lienable in the first instance under Utah Code section 38-1-3 nor
under the applicable part of this Court's holding in First of Denver .
13

requirement to allow entitlement to a lien for any work that simply benefits any property
would go too far. This Court rejected a similar argument in Stanton Trans. Co. v. Davis,
supra. The property there was improved by the drilling of an oil well. Id. at 208. Delivery
of the oil rig to accomplish the drilling obviously benefitted the property, as the actual
drilling would not have otherwise been possible. But this Court, based on the language of
the statute, rejected the transport company's effort to rely on the mechanics lien statute.
"While it is true that our statutes are to be liberally construed to give effect to their purpose
and to promote justice, it is equally true that they should not be distorted beyond the intent
of the legislature." Id. at 189. To expand the lien laws to cover property that is simply
benefitted by labor or materials, as the district court did in the instant matter, would ignore
and eviscerate the requirement that work by a contractor or a laborer be performed "upon"
the property. The legislature has determined, and this Court has clarified, that such work
must be performed "upon" property in order to entitle someone to a lien on that property.
"Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this Court will not look beyond the
same to divine legislative intent. Rather, we are guided by the rule that a statute should
generally be construed according to its plain language." Garrard v. Gateway Financial
Services, Inc., supraf f 11 (quoting Brinkerhoffv. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989)).
The statute, as written, is clear, and prevents arbitrary or uncertain application of its
provisions.

14

2.

To the Extent the District Court Relied on its Belief that the Roads at
Issue Were Mere ATV Trails Before Appellee Paved Them, the District
Court Erred,

Appellant voiced its concern in its opening brief that the district court may have relied
on incorrect facts when it ruled that First of Denver in some way authorized a determination
that Appellee was entitled to lien abutting lots. In particular, Appellant showed that the
district court erred when it determined that it was undisputed that "the roads paved by
Plaintiff were, prior to such paving, 'accessible only by foot, on horse, ATV, or four wheel
drive truck." Mem. Dec, p. 20 (R.996). Appellant demonstrated that, based on Appellee's
own allegations and evidentiary submissions, that this factual finding had no evidentiary
basis, and was improper. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 24-25, referencing, e.g., Appellee's
memorandum supporting its cross motion, p. 5, f 2, and the Exhibits described therein
(describing in detail the road improvements such as excavation and grading performed by
R&W Excavating before Appellee paved the roads) (R.641); Barnhart Affidavit, ^ 14,15
(Exhibit 3 to Mem. in Supp. of Plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Sum. Judg. and in Opp. to
Kennedy Funding, Inc's Mot. for Sum. Judg.) (R.674-75) (describing the fact that, before any
work was done on the property in August 2005, the roads were simply ATV trails, and then
describing the pre-paving excavation and improvements performed in 2005 and 2006, and
stating that the roads were "later paved" by Appellee in 2007). Thus, Appellant pointed out
that, to the extent the district court believed that Appellee's paving work made the roads
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accessible by more than just foot traffic, horseback, ATVs or four-wheel drive trucks, this
was erroneous. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 24-25.
Remarkably, in response to this, Appellee spends the first six pages of its argument
trying to justify a factual contention it has never asserted and does not believe, i.e., that its
paving work was necessary to make the roads accessible to vehicular traffic. Appellee's
Brief, pp. 8-14. The best argument Appellee can muster is that "the trial court's phrasing is
not inaccurate. "Trior to' [Appellee's] paving, the roads were in fact accessible only by foot,
horse, ATV or four wheel drive. The trial court did not say 'immediately prior to' as
[Appellant] suggests." Appellee's Brief, p. 9. This is unconvincing - no one asserted below
that anyone except Appellee did any paving, or that paving could somehow take place before
the roads were actually excavated and graded. Appellee's own witnesses testified they could
drive on those roads before they were paved. Deposition of Ronald Larsen, pp. 58,147 (id.,
Exhibit L) (R.745-46); Deposition of Daren Cottam, pp. 40-41 (id., Exhibit M) (R.749-50);
see also Shrope Depo., pp. 58-59 (R.735-36). Accordingly, the district court's factual
determination was incorrect and improper. See Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d
1097,1100 (Utah 1995); Territorial Savings & Loan Ass n v. Baird, 781 P.2d452,456 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). To the extent the district court determined that the holding in First of
Denver somehow applied because of this unsupported factual finding, the district court erred.
Similarly, there was no foundation for the district court's second factual determination, that "[w]ithout the pavement, there was no possibility of the development working
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financially." Mem. Dec, p. 20 (R.996). The affidavit on which it was based contained only
an unfounded and conclusory opinion of a construction manager regarding the financial
expectations of an owner and developer. See Affidavit of Steve Barnhart, \1 (Exhibit 3 to
Appellee's Mem. (R.637)). Appellee sets forth no meaningful challenge to this objection, and
can only assert the fact that the declarant was an "affiliate" of the developer. Not once in
Appellee's three-page argument is there any evidence that the declarant had any actual
knowledge upon which to base the conclusory statement. See Appellee's Brief, pp. 15-17.
Regardless of the evidentiary basis for this assertion, it is irrelevant and should not
have been relied upon by the district court in its determination whether First of Denver
applied to this case. As set forth above, the critical determinations under that case are
whether a contractor's work "enhances the value of the developer's land" aad whether that
work was "necessary to make residences to be built on such property habitable." First of
Denver, 600 P.2d at 525. Whether or not a development will "work financially" has no
bearing on this analysis.
Accordingly, to the extent the district court relied on either of these factual findings
for its conclusion that First of Denver applied to this case and allowed for Appellee's lien,
the district court erred and its ruling should be reversed.
3.

The Authorities Provided By Appellant Below Show the Proper
Determination Here is Reversal,

Both Appellee and the district court gave too little, if any, credence to the extraterritorial case law supplied by Appellant. Both Shelby Contracting Co,, Inc. v. Pizitz, 231
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So.2d 743 (Ala. 1970) and Brannan Sand & Gravel Co. v. Sante Fe Land & Improvement
Co., 332 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1958), are helpful with the analysis at issue here, to wit, whether
work performed on public roads is lienable against abutting lots. Each of these cases deal
with statutes similar to section 38-1-3, and each of these cases determined that abutting
property was not lienable under such statutes. The district court failed to distinguish Brannan
at all, and mistakenly held that Shelby was not applicable because section 38-1-3 does not
require work to be "upon" the property liened. See Mem. Dec, p. 25 (R.1001). Appellee
simply argues that these cases rely on different statutory language, but they do not. Each of
these cases rely on and interpret a statute that requires that work be performed "upon" the
property to be liened. The same is true here. Thus, Appellee is simply unable to provide a
reason why the holdings in those cases should not be applied here.
The language of section 38-1-3, and this Court's prior holdings in Stanton and
Carlson, require that work by a contractor or laborer be performed upon property in order to
lien that property. Accordingly, the cases cited by Appellant are apposite and provide further
evidence that the district court erred when it ruled that Appellee could lien property upon
which it did not perform the work at issue.
CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court and remand this
matter with direction to grant Appellant's motion for summary judgment and dismiss
Appellee's Amended Complaint as against Appellant.
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DATED this/x^day of July, 2010.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

-Frank
fe^fM. Strassberg
Attorneys for Appellant Kennedy Funding, Inc.
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memorandum was mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the />^
following:
Lewis P. Reece
Snow Jensen & Reece
Tonaquint Business Park, Bldg. B
912 West 1600 South, Suite 200
St. George, UT 84771-2747
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